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ABSTRACT: After the collapse of the subway excavation in the Nicoll Highway, extensive in-situ investiga-
tions were carried out to identify causes of the accident. The results of detailed studies disclosed that lack of 
toe-in depth of the diaphragm wall into the stiff competent strata could be one of the causes of the incident.  
This aspect of the studies is highlighted in this paper. 
 
COLLAPSE OF BRACED EXCAVATION IN 
SINGAPORE 
Outline 
At a site of braced excavation for a cut-and-cover 
tunnel construction in Singapore, a large scale col-
lapse occurred on April 20, 2004 over the length of 
100m section of a carriage way called Nicoll High-
way which is located in the southern coast of the 
Singapore Island as shown in Fig. 1. A closer map 
of the location is shown in Fig. 2. The construction 
south of Nicoll Highway Station was underway in-
volving deep braced excavation flanked by dia-
phragm walls. The depth of excavation at the time 
of the failure was 30.8m. The diagram wall 0.8m 
thick was braced by the steel struts with the help of 
walers and splays. The collapse took place when 
excavation was underway below the 9th step of 
struts already in place.  
As a result, the soil mass moved towards the ex-
cavated space involving large slides on both sides 
accompanied by the subsidence in the surrounding 
area. The site is underlaid by thick deposits of soft 
marine clay to a depth of about 35m. Following the 
incident, detailed studies have been made includ-
ing borings, sounding, sampling, lab. testing and 
numerical analyses simulating conditions at the 
time of the failure. The outcome of the studies was 
reported by Tan (2006), Yong (2006) and Yong 
and Lee (2007). Although the probable causes of 
the incident were pointed out, the present paper 
will focus on one of the likely causes which are as-
sociated with poor understanding of soil conditions 
in the extremely soft soil area in Singapore. 
Collapse of the strut-supported excavation 
A section of temporary retaining wall structure ad-
jacent to Nicoll Highway collapsed almost sudden-
ly within a matter of a few minutes at 3:30 p.m. on 
April 20, 2004. An overview of the site of failure is 
shown in Fig. 3. This is located at the seaward side 
of the land reclaimed around 1970. The features of 
the braced excavation and collapse are roughly 
shown in the plane view of Fig. 4 where it is noted 
that a large tunnel access shaft (TSA) 17m in radi-
us had been constructed to facilitate transport of 
structure elements and materials down to the floor 
of the excavation. 
Method of construction 
The section of the cut-and-cover tunnels were un-
der construction by means of the bottom up meth-
od with two lines of diaphragm walls supported by 
strut-waler-splay system. The thickness of the dia-
phragm wall was 1.0m at the location of cable 
crossing and at the end section next to the access 
shaft. Otherwise the thickness was 0.8m. One ele-
ment of the wall each 3 to 6m wide was excavated 
in slurry by means of a basket-type digging ma-
chine in two or three bites. After lowering the rein-
International Symposium on Backward Problems in geotechnical Engineering  TC302-Osaka 2011 
36 
 
forcement cages, concrete was poured in by 
Tremic pipes. Joints of neighboring elements of the 
wall was sealed against water penetration, but not 
rigidly connected as structures. The diaphragm 
walls, over the section Type M3, were for the 
curved stretch closest to the access shaft and con-
structed in May 2003. The walls were designed to 
be extended 3m into the stiff base layer called Old 
Alluvium (OA-layer). A detailed plan view of the 
M3 section is shown in Fig. 5 and a typical side 
views of the strutting system for the cross section 
A-A’ is displayed in Fig. 6.  
The diaphragm walls were supported by the 10 
levels of steel struts with discontinuous walers ex-
cept at the top strut. To reinforce the strutting ac-
tion, two soil layers at the depths of 28 to 29.5m 
(sacrificial strut) and of 33.5m to 36.5m were sta-
bilized as shown in Fig. 6 by means of the jet 
grouting which had been installed from the ground 
surface before the excavation began. At the same 
time, with an aim of providing support for the 
railway tunnel structures to be placed later, four 
lines of bored piles each 1.4  to 1.8m in diameter 
were installed from the ground surface at a spacing 
of 4m or 6m as shown in Fig. 6. The depth of the 
pile embedment was 34.2m on the north side 
counted downwards from the elevation of 74.2m 
RL and, it was 29.6m RL on the south side from 
the elevation of 69.6m RL as shown in Fig. 6, 
where RL (Reduced Level) means a local measure 
of elevation with a zero point taken at a depth 
100m from the mean sea level. 
Situations around the time of the collapse  
Excavation with strutting had gone without any 
hitch until the 9th strut was installed. It was envi-
sioned at this stage that the entire lateral load near 
the bottom of the excavation was surely transferred 
to the 9th strut. Then, the excavation to the 10th 
level of strut was started, thereby taking out the jet-
grouted portion 1.5m thick. At this stage, the struts 
located in this stretch were S333 to S340 with a 
horizontal spacing of about 4m. The width of the 
excavation in plan was about 20m and the depth 
was 30.8m. When the excavation had progressed to 
the location below the strut No. S332 as indicated  
in Fig. 5, the collapse started to occur. That was at 
3:33 p.m. on April 20, 2004. The pictures after the 
collapse, at 3:34 p.m. and at 3:41 p.m. are dis-
played in Fig. 7. These photos looking over to the 
east were taken from the window of the apartment 
building just north of the Nicoll Highway.  
In the morning of April 20, from 9:00 a.m. to 
10:00 a.m. engineers on the spot is said to have 
heard sounds of metallic collision near the north 
side of the strut S338 and observed the inner flange 
of H-beam waler at the 9th strut having buckled 
and shifted about 5 to 6cm downward. This shift 
aggravated to about 20cm by 2:30 to 2:45 p.m. It 
was also witnessed around this time that the inner 
flange of the waler at the 9th strut S335 on the 
south side had also buckled. Between 2:00 p.m. 
and 3:00 p.m. the sounds of metallic collision were 
heard more frequently and eventually the collapse 

























Fig.1 South part of Singapore. 




























































Fig. 3 Oblique view of the site to the east after the collapse. 




























































Fig. 5 Plan view of the Type M3 section due west of the access shaft.


























Fig. 6 A typical side view of the strutted system for the 
































Fig. 7 Photos showing the incident at 3:34 p.m. and 3:41 
p.m. 
Conceived causes of the failure 
After the occurrence of the collapse, the Commit-
tee of Inquiry (COI) was established and probable 
causes were investigated and pointed out. In May 
2005 the COI report was released, thereby indicat-
ing the main reasons as described below. 
(1) Under-design of the diaphragm wall using an 
inappropriate method of analysis. 
(2) Under-design of strut-waler connection, partic-
ularly in the curved section due west of the SA 
shaft.  
(3) Incorrect back analysis and problems with in-
strumentation and monitoring for conducting 
the observation-led construction control.  
These would have been combined to induce the 
failure and detailed account is described for each 
of the above items in the papers by Tan (2006), 
Yong (2006), and Yong and Lee (2007). It is not 
the intention of this paper to debate on these items. 
The purpose herein would rather be to focus on 
features of soil conditions which have not been 
thoroughly discussed, but unearthed more recently 
through further investigations in details. 
Soil conditions at the site of the incident 
In the design stage before the incident, soil condi-
tions were investigated by means of boring, sound-
ing, and recovering undisturbed samples and test-
ing in the laboratory. The locations of borings, 
standard penetration tests (SPT) and cone penetra-
tion tests conducted at the design stage in the vi-
cinity of the failure zone are shown in Fig. 8 with 
symbols ABH. Also designated by AC in Fig. 8 are 
the places where the cone penetration tests (CPT) 
were carried out. Cone tests were also performed at 
the locations denoted by MC2026, 3006 and 3007. 
The results of the boring and SPT N-values at 
the site ABH30, 31, 32 and 84 are shown in Fig. 9. 
It may be seen that the recent fills exist to a depth 
of 3 to 5m underlaid by a thick deposit of soft ma-
rine clay, M, having a SPT N-value of zero. In the 
middle of this clay deposit, there exists a stiff silty 
clay layer of fluvial origin about 3m thick at the 
depth of 18 to 20m. This layer has a SPT N-value 
of 10 to 15 and denoted by F2. 
The deposits M and F2 are called Kallang For-
mation.  Under the Kallang Formation, there ex-
ists a stiff silty sand layer having variable SPT N-
value from 10 to greater than 100. This layer is an 
old alluvium and denoted by OA. Between the ma-
rine clay M and the OA layer, there exists occa-
sionally the estuarine deposit, E, consisting of or-
ganic soil and also the fluvial layer F2. 
As a result of physical and mechanical tests, the 
marine clay was found to possess the plasticity in-
dex of 30 to 50 and compression index of Cc=0.9. 
The undrained shear strength was shown to be in 
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the range of Su=20~60kPa at depths of 40m and 
the clay is still slightly under-consolidated state 
with OCR=0.8~1.0. It was considered important to 
determine the elevation of the Old Alluvium (OA), 
as it was defined as the base of the bottom deposit 
into which the diaphragm wall was to be embed-
ded. In the design, the toe of the diaphragm was set 
to be 3m below the top of the OA layer.  
In view of its importance, the contour lines indi-
cating equal elevations of the top of the OA layer 
were also drawn in Fig. 8, on the basis of the in-
formation available at the design stage. It is noted 
in Fig. 8 that the distance between two adjacent 
boring logs was no shorter than about 20m and 
consequently the buried valley near the southern 
wall close to the access shaft was not identified. 
This fact turned out to be vital for creating the 
worst situations to occur afterwards. 
Post-collapse site investigations for forensic 
diagnosis 
After the incident, no attempt was made to dig out 
the debris buried within the excavated space, be-
cause a new route for the subway construction was 
laid down at the southern side. Thus, the excavat-
ed space was buried instead by dumping soils and 
then in-situ boring and soundings were carried 
out. These included also the investigation of the 
post-collapse conditions of the broken pieces of 
the diagram wall panels, construction machines 
buried within the excavated space. 
(a) Borings 
Outside the zone of the excavation several series 
of boring and soundings were performed to depths 
of about 40 to 50m corresponding to an elevation 
of about 50m RL (Reduced Level). Nearest the 
tunnel access shaft, a pair of boring, AN1 and AS1 
was performed at sites north and south, respective-
ly, of the excavation. Further westward, another 
pair of boring was conducted at the locations BN1 
and BS1. When the drilling hit an obstacle before 
reaching a targeted depth, another hole was 
drilled. Likewise, still other pairs were conducted 
westwards as indicated by the heading letter C, D, 
E and F in Fig. 10. 
Some of the results of the borings conducted at 
points BS1Ea and BS1Eb about 7m south of the 
collapsed wall is displayed in Figs. 11(a) and (b) 
where it can be seen that remains of the grouted 
cement were encountered at an elevation of 73m 
and 67m RL. In another boring at CS1 shown in 
Fig. 11(c), the soil stratification was found to be 
about the same as that before the failure event. 
(b) Magnetic logging test 
This test was intended to detect ferrous metal ob-
structions such as broken pieces of walers, struts or 
construction equipments buried in the debris within 
the sliding zone. The method consists of incremen-
tal lowering or rising of a magnetic probe through 
a borehole and to detect the magnetic reaction at 
varying depths. During the boring, the kind of soils 
was identified permitting depthwise pictures of soil 


























Fig. 8. Contours of elevation at the top of the old alluvium (OA-layer) based on boring data at the design stage. 




























































Fig. 9 Soil profiles at the sites near the excavation obtained before the collapse. 


























Fig. 10 Counter of elevation at the top of the old alluvium (OA-layer) based on boring data after the collapse. 
 
 
The magnetic logging was conducted at a spacing 
of about 2m along the alignment 3m behind the 
northern diaphragm wall. These are denoted by 
WN1 southward to WN34 as shown in Fig. 12. 
Similarly, along the alignment 3 to 5m behind the  
south diaphragm wall, the magnetic logging was 
performed. These are indicated by WS1 to WS33 n 
Fig. 12. When the boring hits some obstructions, 
the drilling was made once again nearby. In the ar-
ea between WS10 and WS14, it was not possible 
for the boring to reach the targeted depths because 
of obstructions encountered midway. Thus, several 
more borings were carried out until they reached 
the OA base deposit. 
Damage features under the ground 
After investigating the location of the exposed top 
of the diaphragm wall panels, it became possible to 
approximately figure out the scenario of the fail-
ure. Exact locations of the panel top in plan view 
are shown in Fig. 12. Based on the features shown 
in this figure it may be mentioned that the collapse 
mechanism at panels M213, M212 and M306 were 
different from that elsewhere and almost certainly 
it involved the toe of the diaphragm wall panels 
kicking in, and flow of the soil underneath the dia-
phragm wall panels. This form of the failure will 
have allowed the maximum southward movement 
of the opposite north wall panels, namely M211 
and M301. 
As a consequence of inward collapse of the re-
taining diaphragm walls, it was speculated that a 
huge amount of soil mass moved into the excavat-
ed space. In fact, a subsidence of the ground sur-
face as much as 10m was observed on the south 
side in proximity to the wall and the settlement ex-
tended about 50m southward, as seen in Figs. 4 
and 12. The area of the ground settlement extended 
also north towards the Nicoll Highway but to a 
lesser extent as can be seen in Fig. 4. Thus, it was 
considered certain that the failure was initially 
triggered by the breakage of the diaphragm walls 
on the southern side, thereby involving a landslide 
towards the excavated space. As a result of losing 
the horizontal support, the northern walls moved 
also towards the excavation, inducing sliding of 
soil mass towards the south but to a lesser extent. 
This scenario of the event was substantiated by 
the borings conducted after the failure in which the 
elevation of the intermediate layer F2 was found to 
be located almost 10m lower than that found by the 
borings before the failure. Note that prior to the 
collapse, the elevation of the base of intermediate 
F2 layer was remarkably consistent across the col-
lapse area, and so provides a good marker for iden-
tifying the vertical displacement of the soil deposit. 
The location of the F2 layers after the collapse is 
shown in the cross-section in Fig. 11. It was then 
possible to depict the mode of soil movement in-
volved in the slides on the south and north sides. 
The approximate locations of the sliding surfaces 
are displayed in Fig. 13 for the cross section 6-6 of 
Fig. 12.  
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As a result of the post-incident in-situ investiga-
tions as above, it became possible to figure out ap-
proximately the states of collapse for each of the 
cross sections indicated in Fig. 14. Shown in Fig. 
15 are probable features of the collapsed waler-
strut system buried within the ground which were 
speculated for the cross section 1, 5 and 7. It is to 
be noticed that in the cross section 1 and 5, the in-
termediate layer F2 is inclined towards the excava-
tion as verified by the boring data at ABH31 and 
32 and also at AS1 and AN1 conducted after the 
failure. This is indicative of the settlement of the 
even deep-seated soil layer involved in the slide. 
Existence of the buried valley 
One of the key issues associated with generic cause 
of the collapse is the depth of embedment of the 
diaphragm wall toe into the stiff base layer OA 
which had been considered competent enough at 
the time the design was made. Thus, it is of crucial 
importance to identify exact configuration of the 
top of the OA layer, and its mechanical properties 
as well.  
By compiling all the data made available after 
the collapse, the contour lines of the top of the OA 
layer were established as demonstrated in Fig. 10 
with a higher level of accuracy as compared to that 
shown in Fig. 8 which was made up with the bor-
ing data at the time of the feasibility study and the 
design. The contour lines in Fig. 10 unveil some 
important features as follows which had not been 
identified in the previous map in Fig. 8. 
(1) There exists a steeply depressed buried valley at 
the location on the south side a few meters 
south of the strut S336 and S337. The bottom of 
the buried valley has an elevation of about 59m 
RL. The buried valley dips steeply towards the 
east from the south end of struts S331. 
(2) The buried valley extends towards the north-
east running on the west side of the tunnel ac-
cess shaft (TSA). 
(3) As typically observed in the soil profiles at 
BS1Ea and BS1Eb in Fig. 11, the SPT N-value 
tends to increase at the elevation of 67m RL 
upon hitting the base layer OA. The SPT N-
values corresponding to the transition zone be-
low the OA layer were collected from other 
borings and shown together in Fig. 16 by 
choosing the nominally identified top of the OA 
layer as zero point. It may be seen that the 
property of soils is not so competent with a SPT 
N-value less than about 30 to a depth of about 



































































Fig. 11 Soil profiles just south of the collapsed dia-
phragm wall panels. 




























































Fig.13. Features of the ground movements towards the excavated space accompanies by the subsidence. 




























































Note: All shapes of diaphragm walls underground  
are unverified assumption 





























Note: All shapes of diaphragm walls underground  




























Note: All shapes of diaphragm walls underground  
are unverified assumption 
 
Fig.15 Cross sections showing the mode of collapse in the zone of failure. 


























Fig.16. SPT N-values from the top of the OA layer  
 
Features of the toe-in of the diaphragm wall 
As results of the detection of the buried valley, 
questions cropped up as to whether the toe of the 
diaphragm wall had been embedded sufficiently 
deep into the base layer of the Old Alluvium (OA), 
and also as to whether the stiffness of the infill ma-
terials near the top of the OA layer was strong 
enough to mobilize the resistance.  
With regard to the latter suspect, closely-spaced 
soil investigations revealed that the upper part of 
the OA layer in the buried valley is comprised of 
sands, silts and clays sometimes containing organic 
materials with the SPT N-value not greater than 30 
as demonstrated in Fig. 16. This fact indicates that 
the infill materials were not necessarily as compe-
tent as they had been expected at the design stage. 
To obtain a clear picture of the toe-in depth, the 
results of the borings at the time of the magnetic 
logging tests plus some others nearby were com-
piled and arranged side-by-side so that soil profiles 
along the alignment south of the diaphragm walls 
can be visualized. The picture arranged in this way 
is demonstrated in Fig. 17 where the top of the OA 
layer considered at the design stage is indicated, 
together with the similar top line established after 
the collapse based on the detailed investigation by 
the magnetic logging. Note that the symbol such as 
M306 to M310 and M212 indicate the location of 
the diaphragm wall panel. It is also to be noted that 
for the section between M212 and M309, the estu-
arine deposit E and the upper part of the OA layer 
might have been displaced laterally being involved 




























Fig. 17. Soil profile along the south wall and bottom of the diaphragm wall. 



























































Fig. 19 Time change of depthwise distribution of the wall measured by the inclinometer in the soil deposit 1m apart from 
the south wall. 
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At the same time, settlements of the order of 5-
10m are envisioned to have occurred in the upper 
part of the OA layer, as inferred from the settle-
ments of the upper lying layer F2, as shown in Figs. 
13 and 15, which was confirmed by the post col-
lapse boring data. From the records of the dia-
phragm wall construction, the bottom line of the 
wall before the collapse is known and it is shown 
together in Fig. 17. 
By comparing the elevations at the top of the 
OA layer before the collapse with those of the bot-
tom of the diaphragm wall, it can be seen from Fig. 
17 that in the eastern zone between WS1 and 
WS4A, the toe-in of the wall was more than 3m. In 
the zone of collapse between WS5 and WS16, the 
toe of the diaphragm wall seems not to be embed-
ded sufficiently deep. However, the depth of em-
bedment into the OA layer may be considered 
deeper than 3m in consistence with that considered 
in the design. It is to be pointed out, however, that 
the quality of the soils at the upper part of the OA 
layer was less competent in stiffness or strength as 
compared to that assumed at the time of the design. 
This point would have a more important bearing 
from the forensic point of view. 
In the area which failed there were inclinome-
ters at or just behind the wall at the north and south 
sides of the excavation. Shown in Fig. 19 is the 
time change of depthwise distributions of the wall 
deflection estimated from the inclinometer, I-104,  
which had been installed in the soils 1.0m apart 
from the south wall near M212 (Fig. 18).  
It is known that the wall deflection started to in-
crease significantly from April 17, 2004 as indicat-
ed by a dash line in the figure. 
The maximum displacement measured at 13:12 
on April 20, 2004 is known to have amounted to 
43.5cm at the elevation of 72m. It is to be noticed 
that actual collapse took place at 15:33. i.e. 2 hours 
21 minutes (141 minutes) afterwards. Thus, it is 
likely that just at the time of collapse, the maxi-
mum value of the wall deflection might have been 
larger than 43.5cm. It should be cautioned that the 
waler-strut system had sustained the deflection of 
at least 43.5cm for the period of 141 minutes with-
out causing collapse. 
To be noticed, moreover, is the fact that the dis-
tribution of the wall deflection shown in Fig. 19 
was obtained by integration of tilts at several 
depths measured by the inclinometer on the as-
sumption that the tilt at the toe was equal to zero. 
This assumption may not be correct in the present 
case, because the toe of the diaphragm wall had not 
been firmly embedded in a stiff base stratum. Thus, 
the distribution of the wall deflection shown in Fig. 
19 should be taken simply as indicating the relative 

















Fig. 19. Probable movements of soils near the toe of the 
diaphragm wall, and uplifting of the kingpost and sag of 




Likely scenario leading to the collapse 
In the light of all pieces of available information as 
described above, the scenario leading to the col-
lapse may be envisioned as follows. 
(1) When the accident occurred at 3:33p.m. on 
April 20, 2004, the front of westward excava-
tion was located at the place of strut S332 as 
shown in Fig. 18. At that time, the 1.5m thick 
jet-grouted stiff soil (sacrificial strut) was be-
ing removed. The underlying soil layers of the 
OA having a SPT N-value less than about 30 at 
an elevation 61-63m must have pushed the 
wall toe towards excavation. The second Jet-
grouted stiff layer (JGP) at an elevation of 69.6 
to 66.6m was unable to resist against that earth 
pressure and thus the diaphragm wall panels 
M212 and M306 were forced to deform in-
wards. It is considered likely that the second 
JGP layer might have been possessed of hori-
zontal stiffness lower than that expected before 
or it might have had brittle characteristics. It is 
to be noticed here that, because of the presence 
of the 66KV electrical cable buried at shallow 
depth through the two panels denoted as GAP 
 in Fig. 18, it was not possible to install the 
bored piles from the ground surface in advance 
underneath the elevation of 71m. This is clear-
ly indicated in the plan of Fig. 5. Because of 
the absence of the bored piles, it was consid-
ered easier for the toe of the M212 to M306 to 
move towards the excavation. 
(2) The inward movement of the wall panel toe 
must have caused some uplift of the soil de-
posits within the excavation, which induced in 
turn a lift-up of the kingpost in the middle of 
the struts. In addition, excavation has nullified 
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friction between the soil deposits inside and 
the diaphragm wall thereby inducing some sag 
of the heavy-weight wall. The sag must have 
caused the offset between the strut and walls. 
(3) This uplift, combined with the sag of the wall 
must have caused the local buckling or break-
age of the flange of the H-beams at connection 
between the walers and struts, creating as 
much as 20cm vertical offset as illustrated in 
Fig. 20. As a result, the net length of the struts 
was shortened and diaphragm wall must have 
deformed further inwards. 
(4) There were inclinometers installed behind the 
walls on the north and south sides as men-
tioned above. The lateral displacement meas-
ured on the south increased to at least 43.5cm 
at the level of 10th strut at 13:12 on April 20. 
This appears to have been induced by the earth 
pressure from behind which was mobilized by 
the inward movement of the wall. 
(5) With the loss of functioning of the waler-strut 
system and increased inward movement of the 
wall panel toe, the integrity of the structural 
support as a whole was completely lost, lead-
ing eventually to the total collapse. This is il-
lustrated in Fig. 20. 
(6) As a consequence of the collapse to the struc-
tural system, the diaphragm wall panels were 
twisted, displaced and rotated, accompanied by 
the slides of the surrounding ground as de-
scribed in Fig. 13. 
 
The scenario of the collapse as described above 
is based on the point of view that the generic cause 
of the failure was the excessive inward movement 
of the toe of the diaphragm.  
Another scenario could be established alternatively 
on the basis of the assumption that the earth pres-
sure acting on the diaphragm wall had been under-
estimated at the time of the design. A greater earth 
pressure than that considered in the design must 
have induced the large deflection of the diaphragm 
wall leading to the breakage of the water-strut sys-
tem. This collapse scenario is addressed thorough-
ly in the papers by Tang (2006), Yong et al. (2006) 
and Yong-Lee (2007). The authors, however, pre-
fer to take the views descried in this paper. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most important lessons learned from the 
incident in Singapore seems to be the fact that, alt-
hough the spatial distance of borings or sounding is 
reasonably short in view of the commonly adopted 
practice, there always are chances to miss irregu-
larity in the deposits such as buried valleys. There-
fore, special precaution should be paid to the soil 
conditions particularly in deep-seated deposits. 
In the area of complicated geological setting, 
existence of buried valleys should be suspected at 
the stage when projects are put forward. In such a 
case soil investigations need to be carried out at a 
spacing closer than that normally adopted. In addi-
tion, properties of soil materials within the buried 
valley should be investigated in details, if it is dis-
covered. The outcome of these studies should be 
meticulously reflected on the grand planning as 
well as on detailed design of the soil-structure sys-
tem considering each phase of construction pro-
cesses. 
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